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EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND
THE ORIGIN OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
James E. Krier*
For legal scholars, the evolution of property rights has been a topic in
search of a theory. My aim here is draw together various accounts (some
of them largely neglected in the legal literature), from dated to modern, and
suggest a way in which they can be melded into a plausible explanation of
property’s genesis and early development. What results hardly amounts to
a theory, but it does suggest an outline for one. Moreover, it provides a
primer on the subject, a reasonably solid foundation for thinking and talking
about the evolution of property rights.
I
Harold Demsetz’s Toward a Theory of Property Rights,1 despite its
many well-known shortcomings, has been the “point of departure for
virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights”since its
publication some forty years ago.2 So I make it my point of departure as
well.

*

Earl W arren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I am
grateful to Greg York, Ph.D. (Biology), M.I.T. 1998, J.D., University of Michigan 2008,
for exemplary research assistance and constructive criticism, especially on matters of
evolutionary biology. Thanks also to the following for discussions, correspondence,
references, and comments on various draft manuscripts: John Alcock, Greg Alexander,
Michael Barr, Ben Barros, Al Brophy, Shahar Dillbary, Bob Ellickson, Lee Anne Fennell,
Owen Jones, Kevin Kerber, Frances Lewis, Carol Rose, Chris Serkin, Henry Smith, and
participants in the Gruter Institute Squaw Valley Conference, May 2007, the University of
Colorado Property W orks in Progress W orkshop, June 2007, and law school workshops
at the University of Alabama and Cornell University. The University of Michigan Law
Library provided its usual extraordinary assistance with source materials.

1

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Amer. Econ. Rev.
Paper & Proc. 347 (1967).
2

Thomas W . Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of
Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S331, S331 (2002). See also id. at S333, where Merrill
lists the shortcomings of Demsetz’s article. We will get to them shortly.
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Demsetz is an economist. The thesis put forth in his article is “that the
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to . . . new
benefit-cost possibilities” as resource values change;3 in other words,
property rights develop in a society when the benefits of having them
exceed the costs of getting them.4 As an example, Demsetz cited anthropological studies of Native American tribes inhabiting Canada’s Labrador
Peninsula.5 Initially the tribes treated hunting lands as a commons open to
all tribal members, who used it for various purposes, including hunting
beaver for furs. For a time, the rate of hunting was naturally limited by the
Indians’ modest needs, but matters changed when a commercial fur trade
with European settlers developed in the early 1700s. The demand for furs,
the rewards from hunting, and thus the rate of hunting, increased. The run
on beaver posed a threat of scarcity. In response, the tribes developed a
system of private hunting territories that were allocated to individual
families, who had the right to retaliate against trespassers.6
It is apparent in his article that Demsetz supposed these measures were

3

Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.

4

See, e.g., id. at 350 (property rights develop when the gains thus achieved
become larger than the costs thus entailed), 353 (discussing “the value and cost of
establishing” property rights). W hile Demsetz argued that costs and benefits affect the
development of property rights, he believed that community preferences also had a bearing,
especially as to the “form” of the rights. Id. at 350. He pictured three “idealized forms of
ownership”– communal, private, and state. Id. at 354. The first he took to be ownership
by all members of a community, and the last to mean ownership by a governing authority,
such as the state, a village, and so forth. As to “private ownership,” usually he took it to
mean ownership by a single individual, in severalty.

5

See Demsetz, supra note 1, at 351 n.3, citing Eleanor Leacock, The Montagnais
“Hunting Territory” and the Fur Trade, 56 Am. Anthropologist No. 5, Pt. 2, Memoir No.
78 (1954). As Demsetz noted, Leacock was in essence building upon, and to some extent
disagreeing with, an earlier work, Frank G. Speck, The Basis of American Indian
Ownership of Land, Old Penn W eekly Rev., Jan. 16, 1915, at 491.
6

Demsetz, supra note 1, at 351-53. Regarding trespass, Demsetz misread the
evidence. Leacock’s Memoir, supra note 5, at 2, emphasized that trespass meant one thing
only, namely an intrusion arising “when hunting for meat or fur to sell. . . . [A] man finding
himself in need of food on another’s land may kill the beaver – even all the beavers in a
lodge – although he cannot kill them to sell the fur.” Notice the perverse incentive that
resulted from this narrow prohibition on trespass: Tribe members could use their own
hunting territories to hunt beaver for sale, and use their neighbors’ hunting territories to
hunt beaver for private consumption.
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a sufficient response to the problem of over-hunting. (He was wrong.)7 His
reasoning will sound familiar, as indeed it was. He based his analysis on
the economics of common ownership, the details of which were well
understood at least a half-century before Demsetz wrote.8 When a resource
is held in common by all, any commoner who exploits the resource gains
the benefits of doing so, whereas the costs spill over onto everybody. In
contrast, individual rights, where each member of the community is entitled
to a separate resource packet, to the exclusion of other members, concentrates costs and benefits and thus creates constructive incentives.
Anyone who decides to use his packet in a given way reaps the benefits but
also bears the costs, equal to the value of opportunities forgone by exploitation as opposed to conservation.
What Demsetz added to this understanding was a fuller appreciation of
the economies realized by individual ownership.9 Notice that even with
individual shares – say of separate parcels of land – still it is unlikely that
all costs and benefits of any owner’s uses will thereby be felt exclusively
by him. For example, uses by A of his parcel might affect the parcels of
others, as when A builds a dam that causes a stream on his land to flood the
lands of B and C. A does not feel the brunt of the flooding directly, as he
would were the dam to end up submerging his own parcel under water, but
A can be made to feel it through a process of negotiations whereby B and
C offer him inducements to stop using his land in a way that floods theirs.
Demsetz’s distinctive contribution was to demonstrate how individual
7

See Thráinn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions 251-52 (1990),
discussing John C. McManus, An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North
American Fur Trade, 32 J. Econ. History 36 (1972). McManus learned from historians of
the fur trade “that beaver populations were sharply reduced after the introduction of the fur
trade in the area,” id. at 39, and that the Hudson Bay Company, the only buyer of furs for
a time, had to take its own measures to conserve the beaver population, id. at 46. He
attributed the over-hunting of beaver to, in part, the narrow prohibition on trespass
discussed in note 6 supra, which, in his view, had been adopted to provide a form of social
insurance against threats of starvation. Id. at 51.
8

See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: T wo Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S453, S457 n. 9 (2002) (noting that the
“problem of overuse characteristic of a commons was first systematically studied” in 1911,
citing literature). But one can go back much further, all the way to Aristotle and Aquinas,
for instance, both of whom understood that common ownership promotes not just overuse
of the resource in question, but also underproduction. See, e.g., Aristotle, Politics, Book
2, Part 5 (c.350 B.C.); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological, Second Part of the Second
Part, Question 66, Article 2 (1265-74).
9
Demsetz’s argument built on Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Social Cost,
3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960), which demonstrated that in the absence of transaction costs, all
spillover effects of an activity will be taken into account through negotiations among the
affected parties.

-3-

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

3

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 98 [2009]

holdings reduce the transaction costs of the negotiation process by reducing
the total number of people who have to negotiate. When a resource is held
in common by all, everybody has to negotiate with everybody else.
Individual property rights, in contrast, economize on these transaction costs,
because only the neighbors with affected parcels (in our example, B and C)
need negotiate with A.10 Negotiations would bring home to A the costs that
his activities impose on others, transforming the costs to them into an
opportunity cost to him that he would compare to the benefits he stood to
realize were he to continue in his ways.11
In contrast to his explanation of the manner in which individual
property rights economized on transaction costs, Demsetz said little about
the process by which the rights developed. He supposed that they resulted
from “gradual changes in social mores and common law precedents,”
themselves to some degree the product of “legal and moral experiments”
– “hit-and-miss procedures” that selected in favor of cost-minimizing
approaches, at least in societies that placed a premium on efficiency.12

10

Hume seems to have anticipated Demsetz’s point by several centuries. See
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 538 (Book 3, Part 2, § 7) (1740, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1965):
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common;
because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that
the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning the whole
project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons
should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so
complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each
seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and would lay the
whole burden on others.
11

I note in passing the oddness of Demsetz citing the development of Indian
hunting territories as a relevant example of his argument. Those hunting territories were
held by families, not single individuals, and family ownership could give rise to high
transaction costs even if the owners were few in number, thanks especially to opportunistic
behavior (freeriders, holdouts) that provokes costly haggling, as in bi-lateral monopoly
situations. This is why modern property law grants tenants in common and joint tenants
the unilateral right to partition their holdings and convert them into ownership in severalty.
In this connection, a close reading of the anthropological evidence cited by Demsetz
suggests that the family territories were subsequently partitioned off to individual family
members – perhaps for the reasons just suggested. See Leacock, supra note 5, at 1 (there
was “continual readjustment of band lands to fit the needs of band members. Each Indian
has a right to trapping lands of his own . . . .”) (emphasis added). That the hunting
territories were, prior to partition, a commons, though one limited to family members
(which could be few or many), might be another reason the beaver stock was overhunted,
as discussed in note 7 supra.
12

Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. In a later article, Demsetz asserted that “a rightdefining and conflict-resolving institution, such as the court system, the legislature, or some
community authority, is inevitably part of any property right system.” Harold Demsetz,
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II
Here is a summary of Demsetz’s account and its problems:
Demsetz was explicit about the cost-benefit criterion for change in
property rights, offered a sophisticated account of the benefits of
property, and included one compelling illustration of his thesis.
But the article said nothing about the factors that determine the
costs of a property regime. It said virtually nothing about the
precise mechanism by which a society determines that the benefits
of property exceed the costs, other that to disclaim any position on
whether this would entail a “conscious endeavor.” And it said
virtually nothing about the form that emergent property rights are
likely to take, other than to observe that whether a society adopted
private property or state-owned property may turn in part on the
“community’s tastes” for collectivism.13
What with all these shortcomings, Demsetz’s argument would seem to
contribute little to understanding the evolution of property rights. Well, it
now appears, Demsetz never had any such aim in mind when he wrote
Toward a Theory of Property Rights. Recently (less than a year ago as I
write this), Demsetz said that he had not claimed to view changes in
property rights (or social change in general) “as an evolutionary process”;14
he had sought only to suggest a positive theory that property rights develop
in response to costs and benefits;15 he had chosen to “avoid the different,
difficult problem of how property right adjustments are actually made.”16

Property Rights, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, at 144 (Peter
Newman ed. 1998).
13

Merrill, supra note 2, at S333.

14

Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,”
4 Rev. L. & Econ. 127, 128 (2008). I thank Brett Frischmann for calling this item to my
attention.
15

Id.

16

Id. at 129. It is odd that Demsetz waited so long to set the record straight. He
had a perfect opportunity to do so at a 2001 conference convened particularly to reexamine
Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The title of the conference was “The Evolution of
Property Rights.” Conference papers were subsequently published in Symposium, The
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. No. 2, Pt. 2 (2002). Virtually all of the
papers take Demsetz’s article as an evolutionary account. Demsetz himself participated
in the conference and contributed a paper. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a T heory of
Property Rights II: The Competition between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J.
Legal Stud. S653 (2002). Nowhere in that paper did he comment on the misapprehensions
of his work.

-5-

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

5

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 98 [2009]

III
Even if Toward a Theory of Property Rights has no theory about the
evolution of property rights, still it can be used to illuminate the subject.
First, though, I want to establish a clear understanding of what the subject
is. The legal literature on the evolution of property rights regularly uses
“property rights” and “evolution” and “evolutionary theory” as if their
meanings were unambiguous and shared by all, which they are not,
resulting in an unnecessary muddle. So let me specify exactly what I take
the key terms to mean.
“Property rights.” Begin with two assertions made by Jeremy
Bentham. First: “The idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such or such an advantage
from the thing possessed, according to the nature of the case.” And second:
“Now this expectation, this persuasion, can only be the work of law.”17
For purposes of constructing an evolutionary account, we have to define
property rights in a way that accepts Bentham’s first statement but rejects
his second one. The second statement has to be rejected simply because
property rights, in the sense of Bentham’s “established expectations,”
emerged thousands of years before the existence of any “law.”18 Primitive
property rights were de facto, not de jure. The feature that defined them
as de facto property rights, as opposed to de facto some-other-sort-ofrights, is that they concerned assets from which possessors (owners) could
choose to exclude others with the expectation that those others would
respect that choice. Probably there were often situations in which several
individuals shared possession; in such a case, any of them could exclude
any non-owner, but not other co-owners. Still, though, the co-owned
possession would be private property, because of the right of the co-owners
to exclude non-owners. This stands in contrast to an open-access commons
(as in the state of nature, a universal commons), as to which everyone has
access and no one is entitled to exclude. If no one has a right to exclude
anyone, there is no property.
Demsetz, recall, talked in terms of “communal” property, which he

17

J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation 111-12 (4th ed. 1882). See also id. at 113
(“Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was
no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”).
18

See, e.g., Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and
Evolution 382 (2004) (individual claims on property preceded the development of
agriculture about 11millennia ago, and became more extensive thereafter; the rights
“emerged and proliferated without the assistance of state or other centralized enforcement
agencies.” Many thousands of years later, “centralized forms of punishment and
enforcement of property rights began to emerge as a new form of organization.”).
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described as property belonging to all members of a given community.19
An ambiguity thus arises. If, as is likely, Demsetz thought that members
of a given community would not aim to exclude each other in such a case,
but would aim to exclude members of other communities, then there would
be what is called, in modern parlance, a limited-access commons (maybe
not limited very much, but nevertheless limited). Demsetz made no
mention of such a commons, apparently not noticing that his example of a
tribal system of family allotments amounted to such. For him there was
communal property belonging to all, private property belonging to a single
individual, and state property belonging to the government. This is clumsy
not only because it overlooks the limited-access commons but because it
implies that private property is conterminous with individual ownership,
but obviously it is not. As Carol Rose has nicely put it, a limited-access
commons is common on the inside, but private on the outside20 – the former
because co-owners may not be excluded, the latter because non-owners may
be excluded. Private property is inclusive of individual property, but the
converse does not hold.
None of the foregoing should be taking to suggest that property rights
are limited to the feature of exclusion (hardly), but exclusion is enough to
get us started.21 We can picture an exclusion continuum running from a
single owner to a few co-owners to many co-owners of the right to exclude
from some given possession. The greater the number of co-owners of a
resource, the more likely the resource will suffer the mismanagement and
undue exploitation characteristic of an open-access commons.
“Evolution” and “evolutionary theory.” As any dictionary will
confirm, “evolution” is a term with many meanings. It refers, in the most
general sense, to a process of gradual change, and it goes without saying
19

See supra note 4.

20

See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 155 (1998) (referring to
“commons on the inside, property on the outside.”). This usage is consistent with everyday
lay usage. Suppose you and I own Ouracre as tenants in common. Is it not our private
property?. And so too if we join with twenty more, or one hundred, or one thousand? Still,
some property scholars subscribe to a view that “private property” refers only to ownership
by “one person or a small number of persons.” See, e.g., Thomas W . Merrill, Property and
the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 733 (1998) (using that definition). I regard this
as not quite correct, though I suppose it matters little so long as everybody agrees on what
everybody is talking about. But, as I have already suggested, everybody does not; hence
the muddle.

21

On the centrality of the exclusion right to the conception of property, see, e.g.,
Merrill, supra note 20 (passim).
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that property rights have, in this sense, evolved. Primitive rights emerged
at some point, and they were followed eventually by developments that
culminated in the full-blown property systems of modern times. A project
that merely described the course of events would be an evolutionary study
of sorts, and would no doubt provide fodder for an evolutionary theory, but
it would not amount to one. An evolutionary theory of property rights aims
to provide a plausible explanation of the genesis and development of
property rights, given whatever evidence we might happen to have.
There are at least two very different types of evolutionary account that
might be used to explain the emergence of property rights. One type views
property as the product of intentional undertakings; property is “designed.”
The other type sees property as an unintended consequence of individual
actions; property arises “spontaneously.” To account for property in the
latter manner is to present an invisible-hand explanation, which “explains
what looks to be the product of someone’s intentional design, as not being
brought about by anyone’s intentions.”22 This definition does not exclude
all intentions, but only any intention to achieve the particular developments
in question.23 Adam Smith long ago highlighted the distinction in The
Wealth of Nations, when he spoke of a marketplace where every individual
“intends only his own gain,” yet is “led by an invisible hand to promote an
end which was no part of his intention.”24
The most familiar evolutionary account of the invisible-hand type is
Darwin’s theory of the origin of species. (The point of view opposed to it
is an intentional-design type of account, aptly named Intelligent Design.)
But evolutionary explanation is not limited to prehistorical events, much

22

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 19 (1974). See also Bowles, supra
note 18, at 57 (using the same terminology). Nozick cited a number of examples of
invisible-hand explanations, most of which would be unfamiliar to legal scholars. See
Nozick, supra, at 20-21. An example he did not provide, but which might be familiar, is
the body of literature arguing that common law rules are pushed in the direction of
efficiency because inefficient rules are litigated more often than efficient ones, thus
increasing the probability that the inefficient rules will be filtered out over time. For
discussion and criticism, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 604 (7th ed.
2007).
23

See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law:
Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, 4 Res. L. & Econ. 1, 10 (1982) (the “inventor of
the bow had an intention, but it was only to help himself or his band; the spread of a new
technique of hunting . . . was surely beyond his purpose.”).

24
Adam Smith, The W ealth of Nations 423 (1776, Edwin Cannan ed. 1937). See
also, e.g., Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, at 485, 493 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (contrasting “individual
motivation and unintended collective consequence”);
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less to biological phenomena. For example, there is a literature on the
contemporary development of property rights, and it uses both types of
evolutionary account.25 Usually, however, government plays some role in
these accounts, whereas I want to focus on the genesis of property, its
emergence many millennia before the state and other governmental
institutions themselves emerged (thus belying Bentham’s assertion that the
existence of a legal system is essential to the existence of a property
system).26 Because property began in prehistoric times, no one can really
prove what actually happened, as a matter of historical truth. The objective
is a plausible explanation, logically intact and consistent with what we
know about human development.
IV
It is a strange thing about Toward a Theory of Property Rights. For
forty-plus years readers have taken it to be an evolutionary account, then its
author says it is not. Critics complain that the article fails to explain how
property rights emerge; Demsetz says he chose to avoid that difficult matter
altogether, aiming only to suggest why property rights emerge. The article
itself is ambiguous, consistent with each point of view. I want to highlight
what Demsetz seems to have said about the evolutionary question of how,
because doing so lets us explore the distinction between the two types of
evolutionary account – intentional design, and unintended consequences.
Intentional design. Bits and pieces of Demsetz’s argument can be
reasonably taken to suggest that he was thinking about an evolutionary
account based on intentional design. His thesis that property rights
developed in response to changes in costs and benefits seems to refer to a
process whereby social costs and benefits were summed up by some kind
of centralized agency, which then chose the most efficient property rights
arrangement, subject to “a community’s preferences for private ownership.”27 The process might be “hit-and-miss” to some degree, and involve

25

See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes (1991) (discussing throughout the governance of relations among neighboring
cattle ranchers by reference to informal norms, and developing a theory of norm
formation); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads,
31 J. Legal Stud. S515, S528-33 (2002) (discussing the spontaneous emergence of snowparking property rights in contemporary Chicago); Katrina Miriam W yman, From Fur to
Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 117 (2005)
(presenting a case study that takes account of the role of government and the political
process in the development of property rights).
26

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

27

Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
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“legal and moral experiments,”28 but “inevitably” there would be a
purposeful and authoritative designer in the picture.29
Unintended consequences. Other bits and pieces of Demsetz’s
argument point in the direction of an unintended-consequences (invisiblehand) type of account. For example, he thought that changes in property
rights in response to changes in cost and benefits did not have to be, and
probably usually were not, “the result of a conscious endeavor”; instead, the
process could involve “gradual changes in social mores” that occurred
without some particular end in mind and entailed no central authority.30
Moreover, individual practices, rather than collective choices, could be the
source of changes in property rights. So Demsetz mentioned an example
involving hunters, each of whom marked the territory he regularly used as
his own, so as to give notice of his claim – presumably with the expectation
that others would respect it.31 He discussed another example involving
portable personal items (weapons, pottery and other utensils) which –
because they took time and effort to produce, were useful, and could be
easily protected by keeping them close at hand – were recognized as private
property in primitive societies, simply as a matter of social practice.32
Now we can take a closer look at the two types of evolutionary account,
and see how they figure in the literature.
V
Begin with intentional design. As Richard Dawkins has pointed out,
a central difficulty with evolutionary explanations based on design is that
they invite “an inevitable regression to the problem of the origin of the
designer.”33 Those who take Demsetz to be making an evolutionary
argument based on intentional design see this difficulty as a central
shortcoming of his work. How did people in the first instance –
commoners living in a state of nature characterized by open access to the
standing stock of resources, no ownership, and no government – get
themselves organized such that they came up with a property system?
This is a crucial question in accounts based on design. It cannot be
28

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

29

See supra note 12.

30

Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.

31

Id. at 352.

32

Id. at 353 n.7.

33

Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale 602 (2005).
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answered simply by asserting that commoners self-consciously cooperated
in the development of property regimes, nor by assuming that central
authorities of some sort imposed property regimes.34 The first assertion,
self-conscious cooperation, begs the question, because it is the absence of
cooperation that was the problem to begin with, brought on, as Demsetz
demonstrated, by high transaction costs. Taking it as a given that property
rights, individual rights in particular, reduce transaction costs once the
rights are in place, the fact remains that the same bothersome transaction
costs must be confronted in order to get the rights in place by means of
cooperation.35 Hence just how cooperation was achieved needs to be
explained. In Demsetz, of course, it was not.
Much the same can be said of the second assertion, centralized intervention by some sort of governing authority.36 How did the authority come
into being, absent cooperation and collective action?37
Readers who take Demsetz’s account as an evolutionary explanation
based on intentional design criticize it on just the grounds sketched above,
and give similar treatment to later works written in a Demsetzian vein. The
charge is that the approach assumes away the crucial problems of collective
action, and of accounting for the presence of government.38 One proposed

34

Unless, of course, the account obviously takes for granted the existence of the
designer, interested only in how things operate from there on. A study of how the Federal
Communications Commission allocates spectrum would not be rightly criticized for failing
to explain how the Commission came to be created, how the authority that created it came
to be authorized, how the . . . , etc.
35

See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 Harv.
J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 325, 337-39 (1992).
36

“Kicking the problem upstairs,” to use Carol Rose’s nice expression. See Carol
M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law, at 93, 94 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).
37

A governing authority might have come into power by force, but still the
collective action persists; the problem becomes one of explaining how any group managed
to organize itself into a force.
38

See, e.g., Krier, supra note 35, at 338 n.44 (collecting citations); Stuart Banner,
Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. Legal Stud. S359, S362 (2001) (collecting
citations). See also Itai Sened, The Political Institution of Private Property 16 (1997)
(observing that the flaw is typical of social contract accounts); id. at 34-38 (discussing
examples); Eggertsson, supra note 7, discussing the failure of various accounts to “deal
with the free-riding problems that plague group decision,” id. at 254, and finding this a
characteristic feature of the “naive theory of property rights,” which “seek[s] to explain the
development of exclusive property rights without explicitly modeling social and political
institutions. . . . Demsetz’s 1967 paper . . . is the classic reference for the naive theory of
property rights.” Id. at 250.
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methodological solution to this problem, developed over the last several
decades, works up from the idea that small, close-knit groups have
advantages in overcoming obstacles to constructive collective action.
Group members are few in number, known to each other, share common
interests, and interact repeatedly among themselves; these features facilitate
cooperation, whether in the formation of property norms by group decision,
or by group delegation to a central authority itself created by group
decision.39 It is likely by this means that individuals moved out of the state
of nature and into increasingly centralized levels of organization,
eventuating, after many millennia, in modern government – the ultimate
designer. More on this later.
Demsetz’s account in Toward a Theory of Property Rights has been
likened to the much earlier views (seventeenth century) of Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke.40 Carol Rose, for example, has said that Demsetz took
their story and “told it once again,”41 and this is, to some degree, certainly
so. Their story, much like his, began with an initial situation of open access
to a common stock of natural resources, no ownership, and no civil
government. Hobbes figured that any commoner taking a thing out of the
stock would thereafter treat it as has own, but would have to stand ready to
defend his possessions against grabbing by intruders. Commoners might try
to enhance the security of their holdings by making contracts among
themselves, promising not to interfere with the possessions of others so
long as others promised the same in return, but self-help was the only
means of restraining promisors from reneging (and think of the transaction
costs!). Hence, Hobbes concluded, life would be marked by ongoing
battles.42 Locke agreed. His labor theory dictated that anything taken from
the commons rightly belonged to the taker, provided there was enough and
as good for everyone else,43 but he conceded that commoners might
39

See Rose, supra 36, at 95 (referring to the argument and noting some of the
leading literature).
40

See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651, Basil B lackwell 1947); John Locke,
Two Treatises of Government (1690, Cambridge University Press, rev. ed 1963, Mentor
Paperback).
41

42

Rose, supra note 36, at 94.
Hobbes, supra note 40, at 81-84 (ch. 13).

43

Locke, supra note 40, at 328-29 (§ 27). See also id. at 330 (§ 28) (“it is the
taking of any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in,
which begins the property . . . .”). Locke’s view is reflected in the rule of capture familiar
to modern property law, according to which wild animals in their natural condition belong
to the first person to kill them, capture them in hand, trap them, or mortally wound them.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1805). The dissent in Pierson
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regularly disregard this principle, with a “state of war” being the likely
consequence.44 Hobbes and Locke both thought that the only solution was
some sort of governing authority arising by mutual agreement among all
(the fanciful “social contract”).45
While Demsetz’s account is similar in a few respects to the views of
Hobbes and Locke, it has one important difference that can easily go
unnoticed. Hobbes and Locke pictured a world of ongoing battles over
possessions, absent the invention and intervention of government. In
contrast, in parts of his article Demsetz seemed to envision a norm of
respect for possession that emerged on its own and went forth without
enforcement. Several instances were mentioned earlier.46 Another lurks
in the logic of Demsetz’s argument. Implicit in his discussion was the
assumption that any commoner who took from the standing resource stock
thereby acquired an individual right to the thing taken, with everybody
acting accordingly. Resources regarded as common while in place were
regarded as private once severed.47 But why might people have behaved in
this fashion?
VI
Consider an invisible-hand answer to the question, one with its own
distinguished forbear. In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume

argued for an alternative rule whereby ownership would vest in the first person to pursue
with a reasonable prospect of capture, id. at 182, and Locke might well have agreed. See
Locke, supra, at 331 (§ 30) (“the hare that anyone is hunting, is thought his who pursues
her during the chase. For being a beast that is still looked upon as common, . . . whoever
has employed so much labor about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby
removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a
property.”).
44

Locke, supra note 40, at 391 (§ 117).

45

Hobbes, supra note 40, at 94 (ch. 15) (need for a governing authority), 109-13
(ch. 17) (governing authority established by mutual agreement), 112 (ch. 18) (power of
governing authority to make and enforce rules); Locke, supra note 40, at 320-22 (§§ 18-20)
(need for a governing authority), 454 (§ 211) (governing authority established by mutual
agreement), 460 (§ 222) (power of governing authority to make “rules set as guards and
fences to the properties of all the members of the society”).

46

See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.

47
Demsetz had to assume such a practice or his argument would have lost its
anchor. If sharing persisted after severance, incentives to overwork the common stock, a
central premise in the logic of Demsetz’s account, would be much reduced, replaced by the
problem of shirking in the maintenance of the common resources.
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introduced the idea of behavioral “conventions”48 that arise spontaneously
from “a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of
the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their
conduct by certain rules. . . . [T]he actions of each of us have a reference to
those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition, that something
is to be performed on the other part.”49 Today we speak of a convention as
a social practice generally adhered to by the members of a particular social
group; without any explicit agreement or external enforcement; thanks to
a general expectation that the practice will be followed; which expectation
is one of the reasons any individual follows the practice; such that the
practice is taken by all to reflect a shared understanding or implicit
agreement.50 Hume’s view, thus understood, anticipated much later
developments in modern game theory,51 in which conventions “are mutual
best response outcomes that are sustained by the fact that virtually all
players believe that virtually all other players will best respond.”52
With respect to property rights, rights of individual ownership in
particular, Hume saw them as the remedy to problems of exploitation.
Without property rights, whatever anyone gathered, grew, or built would be
vulnerable “to the violence of others,”53 but all the while it would be in the
interest of each person “to leave another in the possession of his goods,
provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me.”54 So there
48

Hume, supra note 10, at 490 (Book 3, Part 2, § 2).

49

Id.

50

See Robert Sugden, Conventions, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, at 453, 454 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).
51

See Sened, supra note 38, at 19 (“Hume’s logical analysis preceded by two
centuries similar contemporary game theoretic arguments”). Sened probably had in mind
evolutionary game theory in particular. Evolutionary game theory is an instance of noncooperative game theory; it focuses on the formation of norms and conventions, meaning
patterns of behavior that emerge spontaneously and are self-enforcing. For a quick
overview, see George J. Mailath, Evolutionary Game Theory, in 2 T he New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, at 84 (Peter Newman ed. 1998). As applied to
humans, the approach “stresses rule-of-thumb behaviors that are updated by a backwardlooking learning process, that is, in light of one’s own or others’ recent experience.”
Bowles, supra note 18, at 33. It assumes that individuals are boundedly rational but not
quite so cognitively gifted as the people who populate classical game theory.

52

Bowles, supra note 18, at 43.

53

Hume, supra note 10, at 487 (§ 2).

54

Id. at 490 (§ 2).
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might develop “a convention entered into by all the members of the society
to bestow stability on the possession of . . . external goods, and leave every
one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and
industry.”55 The convention, Hume said, “arises gradually, and acquires
force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the
inconveniences of transgressing it.”56
Hume thought that animals (humans aside) “are incapable of . . .
property.”57 Biologists say otherwise. They observe that members of many
species – various spiders, insects, birds, and mammals, for example –
commonly resolve territorial disputes by a simple rule: “the resident always
wins.”58 The rule, deference to possession, is a product of biological
evolution, and the core explanation of why and how it developed is usually
credited to the biologist John Maynard Smith, who summarized and
extended his views in Evolution and the Theory of Games.59 Here, in
simplified form, is his explanation:
Picture a situation in which two conspecifics (members of the same
species) are drawn to a particular breeding territory with a value v equal to
the gain in reproductive fitness realized by the animal that ends up with that
territory rather than with a less favorable alternative. Either animal might,
with equal probability, arrive first and be a possessor, or second and be an
intruder. And either animal will be either an aggressive type called Hawk
or a passive type called Dove. Hawks fight until one is injured and retreats
to less favorable territory, and in any Hawk-Hawk contest the animals have
equal chances of winning or being injured. (Injury carries a cost c measured
in terms of reduced reproductive fitness). As to Doves, they may engage
in preliminary bluffing but never go so far as to fight, meaning they lose
territory to Hawks and share territory with Doves, but never suffer injury.60

55

Id. at 489 (§ 2).

56

Id. at 490 (§ 2).

57

Id. at 326 (Book 2, Part 1, § 12).

58

See generally Hanna Kokko et al., From Hawks and Doves to Self-Consistent
Games of Territorial Behavior, 167 Am. Naturalist 901 (2006) (“animal kingdom provides
countless examples of the ‘prior-resident effect’”). For a very accessible introductory
discussion, see John Alcock, Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach 264-73 (8th ed.
2005).
59

John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982). Much of
Maynard Smith’s discussion in the book owes to earlier work by him and others dating
back several decades .
60

Id. at 11-12.
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On these assumptions, and remembering that in any contest between two
Hawks, each has a fifty percent chance of the injury, the payoffs (for the
row players) are shown below:
==============
H
1/2(v-c)
0

H
D

D
v
v/2

==============
Beginning with some random mix of conspecifics, how might natural
selection lead the animals to behave? It depends. If v > c, Hawkish behavior is the winner, because any expected fitness losses are more than offset
by expected fitness gains (1/2(v-c) > 0), making the risk of injury worthwhile. Suppose, however, that v < c, so that fighting is a losing
proposition. Maynard Smith demonstrated that what might evolve is a
hybrid Bourgeois type that acts consistently as neither Hawk nor Dove, but
instead behaves in accord with a new rule: “‘if owner, play Hawk; if
intruder, play Dove.’”61 So long as v < c, animals that happen to behave
according to the Bourgeois strategy (protecting what they possess, deferring
to those in possession) fare better than they would by behaving any other
way;62 “they avoid more damaging encounters than the pure Hawks and
win more encounters than pure Doves.”63 Hence the strategy can proliferate
until, eventually, it characterizes the behavior of the entire population. At
that point, Bourgeois is an “evolutionarily stable strategy” (ESS),64
meaning “a strategy such that, if all the members of a population adopt it,
then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of
natural selection.”65
The evolution of the Bourgeois strategy depends on the asymmetry of
possessor and intruder, an observable characteristic that signals to a contestant the role – Hawk or Dove – likely to be played by an opponent, such

61

Id. at 22

62

Maynard-Smith’s analysis and conclusions, given his assumptions, appear to be
uncontested For the mathematical details of his treatment, see id. at 11-23, 94-96;
Hirschleifer, supra note 23, at 20-23. An accessible and instructive explanation of the
Hawk-Dove game, written by Kenneth N. Prestwich, can be found at <www.holycross.edu/departments/biology /kprestwi/behavior/ESS/HvD_intro.html>.
63

Chris Meredith, in http://www.abc.net.au/science/slab/tittat/story.html, at 4.

64

Maynard Smith, supra note59, at 23.

65

Id. at 10.
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that the contestant can behave in light of the information provided by the
signal. It is not necessary, however, that the status of occupant confer any
actual advantage in defending territory. All that matters is that the asymmetry between possessor and intruder “is unambiguously perceived by both
contestants.”66 Where that condition holds, the rule of “deference to possessors” can develop and persist simply as the consequence of utterly selfinterested individual action.67
Social scientists familiar with game theory were quick to notice the
relationship between Maynard Smith’s analysis and Hume’s notion of
conventions. A notable example is the work of the economist Robert
Sugden.68 He altered Maynard Smith’s model to fit the human context –
namely by substituting “a subjective concept of utility for Darwinian fitness
as the measure of success,” and by assuming “that more successful
strategies [conventions, in Hume’s terms] supplant less successful ones by
a process of imitation and learning rather than by one of biological natural

66

Id. at 23. In a case where possession of a territory does confer an actual
advantage in defending it, or where possessors are commonly larger or stronger, the
asymmetry is said to be correlated. “An uncorrelated strategy can be evolutionarily stable
even when there is a correlated strategy available.” Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property
“Instinct,” 359 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. 1763, 1764 (2004), citing Peter Hammerstein,
The Role of Asymmetries in Animal Contests, 28 Anim. Behav. 193 (1981). Moreover,
a strategy might be correlated early on – because possession is sometimes a defensive
advantage, or because stronger individuals generally appear as first occupants – yet become
uncorrelated later on, as the mere fact of possession becomes a proxy for advantages that
in fact no longer hold.
Just as the Bourgeois strategy is an ESS, so is its opposite – if possessor, play
Dove, if intruder, play Hawk. This ESS is regarded as “paradoxical” because evolutionary
theory would seem to rule it out. Animals behaving in anti-Bourgeois fashion would end
up constantly moving around, looking for territory and occupying it, only to be quickly
displaced. There would be no time for breeding. Maynard Smith was aware of the problem (and of the case of a type of spider that seems to exhibit the paradoxical strategy). See
Maynard Smith, supra note 59, at 96-97. A resolution of the paradox is suggested in
Kokko et. al, supra note 58.
67

Maynard Smith’s model shows that the Bourgeois strategy can evolve, not that
it invariably will. See Hirshleifer, supra note 23, at 23 (development of the strategy
depends on individuals “able to distinguish between occupant and intruder situations, and
. . . able to execute the appropriate behavioral maneuvers of both Hawk and Dove”). Still,
Maynard Smith’s analysis “shows that respect for ownership is a possible evolutionary
emergence that need not call upon any force other than private advantage . . . . On the
human level, a corresponding environmental situation might be expected to lead to a ‘social
ethic’ supporting a system of property rights.” Id.
68

Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and W elfare (1986, 2nd
ed. 2004) (the second edition is virtually the same as the first, save for a new Introduction
and Afterword).
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selection.”69 In the biological model, behavior is genetically predetermined.
In the human model, it is consciously chosen, but individually – by any
actor given his or her utility and given the expected behavior of others – not
collectively (whether by agreement among the members of a group, or by
a central authority on behalf of others). Hume supposed, contrary to
Hobbes and Locke, that individual choice could lead to group harmony,
even in the face of self-interest. Sugden aimed to show, in rigorous logical
terms, that Hume was correct, at least as to property rights. He rested his
argument on the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game,70 and reached conclusions
much like those of Maynard Smith. Repeated play would likely lead to a
convention – a de facto property rule – of deference to possessors.71
Sugden’s contribution, the first extensive adaptation of the biological
model to the human context, provided a particularly interesting discussion
of possession as the crucial asymmetry. Given that any asymmetry might
work (the difference between a strong contestant and a weak one, an
attractive contestant and an ugly one, a loud contestant and a quiet one, a
greedy contestant and a generous one, a rich contestant and a needy one,

69

Id. at 62. Despite the substitution, Sugden believed that much of the biological
analysis “can be carried over to the human case.” Id. He expanded on this point later,
noting among other things that since “so many animals do have an innate sense of
possession and territory, it would not be surprising if this were true for our species.” Id.
at 107. To the same effect, see Stake, supra note 66, at 1763 (humans may share a “hardwired” property “instinct”); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9
J. Legal Stud. 649, 657 (evolution may have led to a “hard-wired” defensive attitude
regarding possessions and a deferential attitude regarding the possessions of others). Both
Stake and Hirshleifer discuss the Maynard Smith model and consider its relevance to the
development of property and other rights. See also a commentary on Hirshleifer, Richard
A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9
J. Legal Stud. 665, 672-73 (1980) (briefly discussing respect for possession from the
standpoint of evolutionary theory).

70

Sugden considered several other games as well (the war-of-attrition game – also
considered by Maynard Smith – the division game, and games of commitment). I omit that
part of his discussion because he found the other games led to results matching those of the
Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game. For the curious, the relevant pages are Sugden, supra note
68, at 65-86.
71

Several commentators have argued that deference to possessors might have
evolved because of an endowment effect, according to which an individual puts a
systematically higher value on something possessed than on an opportunity to possess the
very same thing. See Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Private Property, 64 J. Econ. Behav.
& Org. 1 (2007) (passim); Stake, supra note 66, at 1767. The argument is plausible, but
so is its opposite. Rather than generating the convention of deference to possessors, the
endowment effect could just as well owe to it, in that deference to possession adds to the
value of possession.
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and so on), why settle on possession as the decisive factor? Sugden’s
answer began by noting that the point of a convention is to guide behavior.
To perform that function, the asymmetry underlying the convention must
be apparent, salient, prominent. Hume thought possession had a natural
prominence that led people to converge on it, and Sugden agreed. If the
idea is to find a way of assigning objects to people, there is, he thought, “a
natural prominence to solutions that base the assignment on some preexisting relation between persons and objects.”72 Possession is, by the
same token, usually unambiguous, and thus provides a clear indication of
the status of any claimant. This makes possession cheat proof, because it
cannot be feigned. No fine judgments are required, as they would be if the
asymmetry had to do with such attributes as neediness, attractiveness,
strength, and so on.73 Moreover, possession implies some earlier expenditure of effort, some labor, by the possessor, and Sugden believed, like
Locke, that labor is naturally and normally regarded as meritorious.
Finally, there is the biological evidence suggesting that humans, like other
animals, have some “innate sense of possession and territory . . . .”74
Two limitations of the unintended-consequences approach have to be
noted before we move on.
First, its explanatory power depends on a cost-benefit relationship
likely to prevail only when resources are relatively abundant. The
convention of deference, recall, depends on v < c, calculated from each
individual actor’s point of view.75 If resource values increased to the point
that v > c (calculated in the same fashion), the precondition for deference
would no longer be met and the de facto regime would be vulnerable to
breakdown. Hawk would become the winning strategy and the new
equilibrium, resulting in a reversion to a Hobbesian state of nature. This,

72

Sugden, supra note 68, at 97, quoting Hume, supra note 10, at 504 n.1 (Book
3, Part 2, § 3, n.1): “As property forms a relation twixt a person and an object, it is natural
to found it on some preceding relation . . . .” Hume extended the convention of possession
to property acquired by prescription, accession, and succession. Id. at 509-13 (§ 3).
73

In this connection, it is interesting to recall that the majority decision in Pierson
v. Post, discussed supra note 43, opted for first capture of a wild animal, as opposed to the
dissent’s approach of first pursuit, as the act needed to give rise to ownership. The court
selected capture “for the sake of certainty,” noting that the alternative of first pursuit, given
its ambiguity, “would prove a fertile source of quarrels and litigation.” 3 Cai. R. at 179.

74

Sugden, supra note 68, at 107. See also supra note 69.

75

See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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at least, is the implication of high resource value in the animal setting,76 but
surely it has some application to the human animal as well. As Hume
observed, the temptation of one man to interfere with the possessions of
another “is less conspicuous, where the possessions . . . are few, and of
little value, as they always are in the infancy of society.”77 In short, scarcity
threatens breakdown of the convention-based de facto property system,
absent some third-party enforcement authority for which the invisible-hand
argument appears not to provide.78
A second limitation of the unintended-consequences approach is that
it cannot account for anything beyond very simple property rules, this
because of its dependence on asymmetries that must be crude in order to be
effective.79 Recall, for example, the subtle distinctions that governed rules
about trespass on Indian hunting territories.80 it is unlikely that these could
have developed simply by means of a convention based on possession.
And this is true in spades for modern property systems like that of the
common law, with its multiple types of possessory estates, future interests
(contingent or not), servitudes, restrictions on alienability, and so on (and
on, and on). Complicated systems depend to considerable degrees on a
process of intentional design.

76

Alan Grafen, The Logic of Divisively Asymmetric Contests: Respect for
Ownership and the Desperado Effect, 35 Animal Behav. 462, 463 (1987). See also
Maynard Smith, supra note 53, at 95 (when v > c, “it is worth risking injury to gain the
resource,” and “ownership will be ignored”).
77

Hume, supra note 13, at 539 (Book 3, Part 2, § 8).

78

There is some suggestion in the literature that third-party enforcement might
develop spontaneously under certain conditions, thanks to the appearance of punishers who
keep defectors in line. M odels leading to the result can be found in Bowles, supra note 18,
at 381-90; and Christoph Hauert et al., Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly
Punishment, 316 Sci. 1905 (2007).
79

See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that while a
convention of deference to possessors can account for only simple property rules, still the
simple rules can amount to the rights to exclude, use, and transfer usually regarded as the
core elements of property. If there is a practice of deferring to possessors, that is
equivalent to say that possessors may if they wish exclude, that they may use what they
possess, and that they may effectively transfer their rights (the transferee becomes the new
possessor, and hence enjoys deference). All of this follows especially if possession earns
deference even when actual constant physical possession is not required, on which see infra
note 85 and accompanying text.
80

See supra note 6.
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VII
We have considered two different ways to explain the evolution of
property rights. One way attributes property to intentional design, the other
to unintended consequences. Put side by side and compared, the picture is
pretty clear. The great advantage of the intentional-design approach is that
it can, in principle, account for the creation and enforcement of property
rights from alpha to omega, for every detail of any property regime from the
beginning right up to now. The great disadvantage of the approach is that
it entails the difficult task of accounting for the origins of and actions of the
designer. It implies a degree of human rationality that probably had not yet
developed by the time the first primitive property rights emerged.
As to the unintended-consequences approach, its great advantage is that
it requires no designer, and thus need not explain the origins of one. A
consequence of this is that the approach accounts more plausibly for early
de facto property rights, since it works with levels of intelligence lower
than those of even the very earliest humans.81 The chief disadvantages of
the approach are that it copes poorly with the historic fact of resource
scarcity, and cannot explain the development of complex property regimes.
Notice from this little summary how the strengths and weaknesses of
the two approaches match up. What the first approach does well, the
second does not; and what the second approach does well, the first does
not. This, to my mind, facilitates a fruitful combination of the two
approaches. So I conclude with a sketch constructed in that fashion, drawn
in the context of a rough time line of human evolution.
The move from primitive hominids to biologically modern humans
(Homo sapiens sapiens) occurred by increments over millions of years,
with the first primitive Homo probably branching off from its ancestors
about three million years B.P .82 A surge of particularly rapid development
began about 100,000 years B.P ., and, it appears, only in the course of that
period did humans develop the cognitive capacity for language and abstract
thinking.83 It is more plausible, then, to suppose that property rights first

81

Nevertheless, the unintended-consequences (invisible-hand) approach has been
largely ignored in the legal literature on the evolution of property rights, seldom earning
more than a nod, if that. A few exceptions to that generalization have been noted in our
discussion.
82

The abbreviation B.P., commonly used in evolutionary studies, refers to “before
present,” where “present” is taken to be the year 1950.
83

See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in M oral Psychology, 316 Sci.
998 (2007); Edward O. W ilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 564-68 (2000) (briefly
discussing the literature).

-21-

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

21

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 98 [2009]

emerged among early humans as a product of deference to convention, than
as a product of design, simply because early humans probably lacked the
intellectual equipment essential to the design process.
During most of the last hundred millennia, humans lived as huntergatherers. What anthropologists surmise about their modes of social
organization is based in part on backwards reasoning from the behavior of
various still-extant hunter-gatherer groups. Reliable generalizations about
early property rights among hunter-gatherers is consistent with the notion
that the rights emerged as unintended consequences. Individual rights
attached to items severed (or fashioned) from the common stock – gathered
food, tools, weapons, and temporary habitations. In contrast, land and its
standing resource stock were for a very long time regarded as communal,84
probably because the hunter-gatherers’ large foraging territories could not
be unambiguously possessed in the way that such items tools and weapons
could be, and unambiguous possession was, of course, crucial to the
asymmetry needed to drive a convention of deference.85
The status of land in the hunger-gatherer scheme eventually changed
from communal to individual ownership, for reasons tightly tied to the
invention of agriculture about 10,000 years ago. Effective farming would
have been a dicey proposition on communally owned land because of
shirking on the side of production and over-consumption of the harvest –
problems warded off by individual ownership of separate plots. And just
as individual ownership facilitated agriculture, so agriculture facilitated
individual ownership. Planting, tilling, and harvesting had the effect of
marking plots of land with unambiguous signs of possession, thus
providing the asymmetry crucial to deference. This “constructive possession” effect could have reached beyond land to personal items, such as
farming tools or crops stored on the farm plot. By that means, rights based
on possession could come to be “permanent,” rather than “transient,” in that
they persisted even when owners were not in continuous actual possession,
provided there were signs of ongoing ownership claims (recall again

84

See, e.g., W ilson, supra note 83, at 564-68. Koichi Kitanishi, Food Sharing
Among the Aka Hunter-Gatherers in Northeastern Congo, African Study Monographs, 25
Suppl. 3, 5 (M arch 1998), states that “ land and its resources were communally owned,
whereas tools, weapons and procured food were owned individually in hunter gatherer
societies.” He adds, however, that “ownership” of food carried with it an obligation to
share by way of obligatory gifts. See, e.g., id. at 22-24.
85

See Bowles, supra note 18, at 389-90. Recall mention by Demsetz of Indians
marking their hunting territories (which were in fixed locations). See supra note 31 and
accompanying text. Elsewhere he notes that private rights in hunting territories would not
be worthwhile in the case of grazing animals that roam over large tracts of land. Demsetz,
supra note 1, at 353.
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Demsetz’s example of Indians marking their hunting territories).86
Coincident with the emergence and spread of agriculture, “populations
increased enormously in density, and the primitive hunter-gatherer bands
gave way locally to the relentless growth of tribes, chiefdoms, and states.”87
As suggested earlier, what seeded developments in the number and nature
of governing authorities was probably the ability of small close-knit groups
to overcome collective action problems.88 The move from small organized
groups to large organized nation states worked through a process of
aggregation by merger and conquest (of populations and territories.)89
Most likely, this confluence of developments worked a shift in the world
of property rights, making their future largely a matter of social rather than
natural engineering, of design as opposed to evolution. It is a good thing
that matters developed this way. Population growth increased the demand
for resources, and hence their value. From the design point of view,
heightened resource values made new property rights worthwhile – as
Demsetz would put it, the benefits were worth the costs entailed – just at
the time that, happily, there developed new institutions able to design and
enforce the rights. Enforcement was particularly important given that
increases in resource value – the very factor that prodded the development
of new property rights – also threatened the stability of the old rights based
on deference. Property became worth fighting for (v > c). So design saved
us from the moving back to the state of nature – at least so far.
Notwithstanding, what evolved early on continues to endure. Possession, as any property lawyer knows, remains the cornerstone of most

86

See supra note 31 and accompanying text. My reference to “permanent” and
“transient” property echoes the words of another classic figure in the literature on the
development of property rights. See 2 W illiam Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *3-*7 (1765-69), where Blackstone used those adjectives in stating his view of
how property developed over time: first there was an open commons; a commoner who
took from it acquired “a kind of transient property” as to which the “right of possession
continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted.” Then, later, there
developed “permanent” rights that did not depend on constant physical possession. These
permanent rights were first in personal items such as food and clothing. Eventually,
though, land came to be treated in the same fashion, coincident with the rise of agriculture.
Finally, the government entered the picture, to secure rights.
So far as I am concerned, Blackstone’s account was extraordinarily prescient,
anticipating modern accounts (and not just mine) of the evolution of property rights by
more than two hundred years.
87

W ilson, supra note 83, at 569.

88

See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

89

See Robert Carneiro, A Theory of the Origin of the State, 169 Sci. 733 (1970).
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contemporary property systems – nine points of the law, the root of title, the
origin of property.90

90

See, e.g., Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (1774) (Lord
Mansfield observing: “Possession is very strong; rather more than nine points of the law.”);
Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979); Carol M.
Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985).
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